Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Ramsey sentence, theory of science, philosophy: the Ramsey sentence of a theory makes the assertion that the theoretical terms of this theory refer to objects if the theory is true. See also theoretical entities, theoretical terms, existence, interpretation, theories, observation language, reference._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David K. Lewis on Ramsey Sentence - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 78 Ramsey-sentence/Lewis: eliminates theoretical terms in favor of bound variables. >Theoretical term/Lewis, >Bound variable. Carnap conditional: then divides the theory into two parts: a) analytical part of the theory: partial interpretation of the theoretical terms b) synthetic part: the theoretical terms are eliminated here. >Carnap-conditional. IV 81 Ramsey-sentence/Lewis: says nothing more than that the theory is implemented. - Carnap sentence: is neutral as to whether it is implemented. Carnap sentence is a conditional of the Ramsey sentence and of the postulate of the theory 1) the postulate: is logically equivalent to the conjunction of Ramsey and Carnap sentence 2) the Ramsey sentence and the postulate imply exactly the same sentences in old theory 3) Carnap sentence implies no sentences of the old theory except logical truths. Ramsey sentence: could simply replace the postulate (the new theory in a sentence). Carnap: proposes to take the Ramsey sentence as synthetic postulate of T and the Carnap sentence as an analytical postulate of T - They share the work of the original postulate. Postulate/Carnap: systematized the O sentences (old theory) and partially interpreted the theoretical terms. IV 89 Ramsey-sentence/Lewis: states that a theory has at least one implementation - this is weaker than our extended postulate/Lewis: this implies that the theory has been implemented once. IV 259 Ramsey-sentence/Lewis: wipes out the difference between intensional and extensional language - at the same time it eliminates technical vocabulary by existential quantification. >Extension, >Intension, >Existential quantification. "Ramsification" neutral level: there is a system of categories, S, N, X/Y, there are three relationships of expressions to things: A-tension, B-tension, C-tension. --- Schwarz I 218 Ramsey-sentence/Lewis/Schwarz: E.g. banana theory: there are things that are long-ish yellow fruits (can turn out to be wrong) - Carnap-conditional: if there are things that are long-ish ..., then bananas are long-ish ...- cannot turn out to be wrong (is analytical). >Analyticity/syntheticity. _____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Lewis
> Counter arguments in relation to Ramsey Sentence
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-29